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By SUSAN LORDE MARTIN*
EVERY TEN YEARS OR SO, the problem of excessive executive com-
pensation draws public attention, leading to some political action. In
the early to mid 1980s, writers in newspapers, business periodicals,
and legal journals expressed concern over golden parachutes.' The
publicity resulted in congressional regulation of golden parachutes in
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 ("1984 Act"). 2 The 1984 Act disal-
lowed a business expense deduction to the corporation for any excess
parachute payment, defined as a payment that is made to an em-
ployee who is among the corporation's highest paid, that is contin-
gent upon a change in corporate control, and that is at least three
times the employee's five-year-average taxable compensation. 3 In addi-
tion, the 1984 Act required the employee receiving such a payment to
pay an excise tax of 20%. 4 Congressional reasoning for discouraging
these payments sounds remarkably familiar today: corporate funds
were being used to subsidize corporate executives "greatly in excess of
the individual's historic compensation," and the cost was being borne
by shareholders. 5
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1. See, e.g., Henry F.Johnson, Those "Golden Parachute"Agreements: The Taxman Cuts the
Ripcord, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45 (1985); Robert A. Profusek, Executive Employment Contracts in
the Takeover Context, 6 CORP. L. REv. 99 (1983); Peter L. Coffey, Comment, Golden
Parachutes: A Perk that Boards Should Scrutinize Carefully, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 293 (1984); Ken-
neth C. Johnson, Note, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper
Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909 (1985); Golden Parachutes May Go the Way of the Dodo,
Bus. WK.,Jan. 9, 1984, at 34; Steven Prokesch, Too Much Gold in the Parachute?, N.Y. TiMES,
Jan. 26, 1986, § 3, at 1.
2. 26 U.S.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (Supp. III 1985). The golden parachute provisions of the
1984 Act were modified by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 26 U.S.C. § 280G (2000).
3. Id.
4. 26 U.S.C. § 4999 (2000).
5. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS AP-
PROVED ON MARCH 21, 1984 1 (Comm. Print 1984) (commenting on the Deficit Reduction
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About a decade later, executive compensation was once again in
the news. 6 Commentators referred to 1992 as the year of the pay pro-
test.7 Executive compensation became an issue for the candidates in
the 1992 presidential campaign. It had become clear that the 1984 Act
was ineffective in curbing excessive executive compensation in the
event of a takeover.
Some companies adopted a "gross-up" plan in which the corpora-
tion would compensate recipients of golden parachutes for the 20%
federal excise tax-in effect, completely defeating the purpose of the
tax by once again having shareholders bear additional costs for execu-
tive compensation.8 Corporate compensation consultants noted that
whenever the government put limits on executive compensation, cor-
porations automatically restored the lost benefits through alternative
means.9
In 1992, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") issued
new executive compensation disclosure rules10 and new shareholder
communication rules. 1 Their purpose was to give shareholders more
understandable information about exactly what top corporate execu-
tives were being paid, 12 so shareholders could then act on the infor-
Act of 1984); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACr OF 1984 (Joint Comm. Print
1984) (discussing H.R. 4170, 98th Cong. Public Law 98-369). ThisJoint Committee Print is
commonly known as the Blue Book.
6. Jill Abramson & ChristopherJ. Chipello, Compensation Gap: High Pay of CEOs Trav-
eling with Bush Touches a Nerve in Asia, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1991, at Al; Jeffrey H. Birn-
baum, From Quayle to Clinton, Politicians Are Pouncing on the Hot Issue of Top Executives' Hefty
Salaries, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1992, at A14; Jill Dutt, Study Shows Anger over Executives' Pay,
NEWSDAY, July 1, 1992, at 42; Joseph Ehrlich, Manager's Journal: Give Workers a Break by Tak-
ing a Cut, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1992, at A14; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Metaphor for
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, § 4, at 13.
7. Amanda Bennett, A Little Pain and a Lot to Gain, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at RI
(within a special section called Executive Pay).
8. See, e.g., Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Cont'l, Inc., No. 9813, 1988 WL 46064, at *3
(Del. Ch. May 9, 1988) (noting that the Agross-up@ plan cost the corporation at least $13.8
million).
9. Ellen E. Schultz, More-Equal Benefits Go to Some Top Executives, WALL ST. J., May 25,
1992, at CI, C17.
10. Executive Compensation Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249 (1992).
11. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249
(1992). In a SEC meeting about the new rules, Commissioner Paul Atkins referred to the
1992 rules about executive compensation and noted that the present meeting reminded
him of the movie Groundhog Day, in which the same day was lived over and over again.
Paul S. Atkins, SEC Commissioner, Open Meeting Statement: Proposed Revisions to the
Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure Rules (Jan. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706psa.htm.
12. Executive Compensation Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249 (1992).
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mation to influence corporate decision-making. At the time, these
rules caused more comment than any other single subject in SEC his-
tory.' 3 Business leaders complained that disclosures about executive
compensation would give an advantage to competitors and make it
harder to recruit board members.14 Nevertheless, as public complaints
continued, in 1993, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to
limit the corporate tax deduction for executive compensation, other
than performance-based compensation, to $1 million per year.' 5 SEC
Commissioner Paul Atkins has noted that this so-called Million Dollar
Rule has cost companies 35% more to pay executives in excess of $1
million a year, an unintended consequence of attempting to rein in
executive compensation. 16
Unfortunately, the Sturm und Drang of the last few decades about
executive compensation and its regulation has proved to be just busi-
ness as usual. In 2006, commentators are describing executive com-
pensation as obscene, but now "[w]hat everybody does not know is
how obscene obscene is."' 7
13. Kevin G. Salwen, SEC to Allow Investors More Room to Talk, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15,
1992, at Cl.
14. See, e.g., Joann Lublin, Executives Grumble About SEC Plan to Require More Pay Data,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at BI (quoting Robert H. Malott, retired CEO of FMC Corp.).
Business leaders argued that disclosing links between managers' bonuses and business
goals, such expansion or diverstitute, for example, could help competitors learn their busi-
ness strategies. Id. Furthermore, potential board members might be reluctant to serve be-
cause of increased legal liability. Id. See also Bruce Atwater Jr., Chairperson and CEO of
General Mills, Inc.; Ray McGovern, General Counsel for Omnicom Group Inc.; Thomas
Ashford, Assistant General Counsel for American Electric Power Service Corp.; and Martin
Emmett, Chairperson and CEO of Tambrands, Inc; SEC to Rule on Shareholder Rights, NEws-
DAY, Sept. 22, 1992, at 31 (noting business groups fighting shareholder communication
proposals and SEC Commissioner criticizing compensation rules as being confusing).
15. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993) (amending I.R.C. § 162(m) (1993)).
16. Atkins, supra note 11.
17. Gretchen Morgenson, A 'Holy Cow'Moment in Payland, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006,
§ 3, at 1 [hereinafter Morgenson, Holy Cow] There are some commentators who argue that
executive compensation is not excessive. See, e.g., MarkJ. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of
Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2000). However, they are certainly in the
minority, and some who made that argument in the past are no longer making it today.
Compare Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get, 64 HARV. Bus. REV.
125 (1986) (asserting that executive compensation is not excessive) with Michael C. Jensen
& Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got Here, What Are the Problems,
and How to Fix Them 98 (Harvard NOM, Working Paper No. 04-28, 2004), available at http:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=561305 (noting that in the past they would have said that CEO com-
pensation was not high enough to attract the most talented people, but they no longer
believe that to be true, and they acknowledge problems of substantial agency costs in exec-
utive remuneration).
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The purpose of this Article is to describe the new SEC rules relat-
ing to executive compensation, to discuss their chances of success in
curbing abuses, and to suggest other reforms-in addition to disclo-
sure-that might rein in runaway compensation abuse and improve
business success. Part I introduces the rules and questions the possibil-
ity of their success in curbing excessive compensation. Part I. explains
how and why executive compensation becomes excessive and high-
lights regulatory failure in reining in executive pay. Part III discusses
economic theories that are used to explain excessive executive pay
and potential cures. Parts IV and V suggest additional reforms, such as
greater shareholder and worker participation in corporate govern-
ance, and conclude that without such changes the new disclosure
rules will not be very effective.
I. The Proposed Rules
The SEC's purpose in promulgating the new rules is to make cor-
porate reports, proxy statements, and registration statements easier to
understand and to give investors a clearer idea about the compensa-
tion awarded to top officers and board members,1 8 the same purpose
the SEC has had for almost seventy years. The SEC first promulgated
compensation disclosure rules in 1938.19 Since then, the SEC has reg-
ularly issued new rules about how compensation information should
be disclosed so that it would be most useful for investors: sometimes
emphasizing narrative disclosure, sometimes tabular disclosure, and
sometimes a combination of the two.2 0 However well-intentioned, gov-
ernment regulations cannot seem to overcome the ability of corporate
directors and executives to circumvent regulations and award greater
and greater compensatory largesse to top management.
The new rules improve the tabular disclosure and also require a
supplementary narrative for three categories of compensation: (1)
current and deferred compensation for the three most recent fiscal
years, including earnings, options, and restricted stock; (2) equity-re-
lated interests for current compensation or potential future gains; and
18. Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No.
33-8655, 34-53185, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
19. Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-1823, 3 Fed. Reg. 1991-92
(Aug. 13, 1938).
20. See, e.g., Disclosure of Executive Compensation, Release No. 33-6486, 48 Fed. Reg.
44467 (Sept. 23, 1983) (tables only for cash compensation); Amended Proxy Rules, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-4775, 17 Fed. Reg. 11,430-31 (Dec. 11, 1952) (separate table
for pension and deferred compensation); Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,653 (Dec. 18, 1942) (first tabular disclosure).
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(3) retirement and other post-employment benefits. 2 1 The require-
ments also include a compensation table for directors.2 2
Another new requirement is the inclusion of a "Compensation
Discussion and Analysis" section that explains the specific information
contained in tables and answers the following questions:
*What are the objectives of the company's compensation
programs?
*What is the compensation program designed to reward and not
reward?
*What is each element of compensation?
*Why does the company choose to pay each element?
eHow does the company determine the amount for each element?
*How does each element ... fit into the company's overall com-
pensation objectives ... ?23
The purpose of this section is to discourage boilerplate disclo-
sures that fail to provide comprehensive and meaningful information
specific to each company. 24 This section should explain, for example,
the role of executives in the compensation process, the relationship
between compensation and performance, and the basis for awarding
long-term and equity-based compensation. 25
Another new requirement is the disclosure of perquisites and
other personal benefits of $10,000, or more, for both executive of-
ficers and directors. 26 Currently, corporations do not have to disclose
perks that are less than the lesser of $50,000 or 10% of total annual
salary and bonus. 27 The SEC decided that the current rule omits too
much information that may be material to investors. 28 In the new
rules, the SEC more specifically defines "perks" because it has been
common for companies to interpret "perquisites and personal bene-
fits... artificially narrowly to avoid disclosure."29 An item is a perk if it
gives the recipient a personal benefit that is not available to all em-
ployees, and whether the item is conferred for some business reason
does not remove it from the "perk" category. 30 An item is not a perk if
21. Proposed Rules, supra note 18, at 6544.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 6545.
24. Id. at 6546.
25. Id. The SEC is careful to note, however, that specific performance-based targets
would not be required to avoid adversely affecting a company's competitive position. Id.
26. Id. at 6552-53.
27. Id. at 6553.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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it is an integral part of the executive's business responsibilities. 3 1 Items
that are perks include club memberships that are ever used for other
than business reasons; personal travel on company planes, yachts, or
cars; personal financial advice; personal housing and living expenses;
and security at a personal residence. 32
The new rules also put an increased emphasis on retirement ben-
efits and other potential future compensation. 33 A new table requires
disclosure of estimated retirement benefits for each specifically
named executive. 34 The SEC is also recognizing shareholder interest
in termination and change-in-control provisions, information that
previously had seldomly been disclosed. 35 Companies will have to dis-
close estimated payments and benefits to be paid in the event of a
resignation, retirement, other termination, change in named-execu-
tives' responsibilities, or change in control of the company.3 6
The new rules also require disclosure of a figure representing to-
tal compensation. 37 Their purpose is to eliminate the "holy-cow mo-
ment" when shareholders learn the CEO is about to collect, for
example, $144.7 million (forJerald Fishman, the CEO of Analog De-
vices) in deferred compensation 38 or $187.5 million (for Richard
Grasso, the former CEO of the New York Stock Exchange) in deferred
compensation and pension benefits.3 9
Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC, has emphasized that the
new rules are intended to improve disclosure by including all ele-
ments of compensation that have changed significantly in the last dec-
ade; however, the SEC's purpose is still "wage clarity, not wage
controls. °40 Chairman Cox is a free marketer who sees the executive
compensation problem as resulting from a migration "away from what
31. Id.
32. Id. at 6553-54.
33. Id. at 6560.
34. Id. at 6561.
35. Id. at 6562.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 6548.
38. Morgenson, Holy Cow, supra note 17, at 1. Directors have nicknamed tally sheets
used to project all the aspects of executive compensation under different circumstances,
"holy cow" sheets. Joann S. Lublin, Adding It All Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at R1.
39. New York v. Grasso, No. 401620/04, 2006 WL 657115, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 15,
2006).
40. Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman's Opening Statement: Proposed Revisions to the
Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure Rules (Jan. 17, 2006), available at
http://Nww.sec.gov/news/speech/spchO 11706cc.htm.
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is transparent to what is opaque."'4' He has asserted that the "market is
capable of disciplining excessive compensation, provided that the
market has adequate information."42
These new disclosure rules seem like a good idea; however, in the
past, attempts to legislate transparency have not been effective in
curbing abuses in executive compensation. Each new requirement en-
courages new vehicles for secret compensation. John Bogle, founder
and former CEO and Senior Chairman of The Vanguard Group, has
noted that the new proposed rules do not require disclosure of the
annual rate of interest executives earn on their deferred compensa-
tion.4' He has recommended to the SEC that this information be in-
cluded in the new rules because the accrual rates "can result in the
accumulation of truly staggering amounts over time. ' 44 At General
Electric, for example, the rates earned by executives on their deferred
compensation have ranged between 9.25% and 13% a year, far higher
than market rates.45 Even if this suggestion is implemented, it is rea-
sonable to wonder what other areas of abuse are waiting around the
corner. Will this set of rules be any different from past attempts at
meaningful disclosure, or will we be writing about its failure ten years
from now when executive compensation has ballooned once again to
unforeseeably high levels?
II. Economic Analysis of the Problem
Although cures have been elusive, there is no shortage of analyses
of the problem of excessive executive compensation. 46 All of them are
based on the "agency problem," that is, the tendency of managers and
directors to act in their self-interest instead of in the interest of share-
41. Kara Scannell, SEC to Propose Overhaul of Rules on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10,
2006, at A2 (quoting Chairman Cox).
42. Id. (quoting Chairman Cox).
43. Letter from John C. Bogle, former CEO and Chairman, The Vanguard Group, to
Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, SEC (Apr. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Bogle Letter], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/cbogle3761.pdf.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Contra LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFUL-
FILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 4-5 (Harvard University Press 2004); MarkJ.
Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2000)
(asserting that CEOs are, in fact, not overpaid at all); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theoy of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 12
(1976), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=94043; see also William W. Bratton, Book Review:
The Academic Tournament over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557 (2005) (reviewing
the Bebchuk and Fried book).
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holder-owners. Professors Michael Jensen and William Meckling have
characterized the agency conflict between managers and shareholders
"as deriving from the manager's tendency to appropriate perquisites
out of the firm's resources for his own consumption. ' 4 7 As Adam
Smith observed in 1776,
[t]he directors of Uoint stock companies] ... being the managers
rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be
expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigi-
lance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently
watch over their own .... [T]hey are apt to consider attention to
small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give
themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profu-
sion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the manage-
ment of the affairs of such a company.48
Professors Lucien Bebchuk and Jesse Fried point to the power
that top managers exert over directors because of the close relation-
ships between the two groups. 4 9 Managers then use that power to ob-
tain greater remuneration than they would receive if they were subject
to arm's length bargaining ("rents") .5 0 They hide these benefits to
avoid the disapproval of outsiders and to limit "outrage costs.
51
Bebchuk and Fried note a variety of factors that contribute to manag-
ers' power. First, directors are often beholden to managers or simi-
larly situated to managers (by being CEOs at other firms), so they will
not bargain effectively at arm's length for shareholders. 52 Second,
poison pills and other anti-takeover strategies53 protect managers
from outside infringement.5 4 Third, managers hire the firm's com-
pensation consultants, who advise on appropriate levels of compensa-
tion for those same managers. 55 Fourth, managers have no incentive
47. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 12 (1976), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=94043.
48. 3 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 239 (Edinburgh, A. Balfour and Co. 1828) (1776) (also cited in Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 47, at 1).
49. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 46; see also Bratton, supra note 46.
50. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 46, at 4-5.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id. at 80-83.
53. A poison pill is a corporate tactic designed to discourage a hostile takeover by
issuing new stock that shareholders can buy at a low price, diminishing the value of the
suitor's stake, and making the corporation much more expensive to buy. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1195 (8th ed. 2004). Other anti-takeover strategies include golden parachutes,
which entitle corporate executives to big payouts in the event of a change in control, and a
scorched earth policy that involves liquidating valuable assets and taking on large amounts
of debt. See id. at 713.
54. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 46, at 83-85.
55. Id. at 36-40.
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to limit their own compensation: very few are fired; they are not seek-
ing promotions; and if they go to another firm, they will have an ad-
vantage if their current pay packages are high. 56 Bebchuk and Fried's
prescription for resolving runaway compensation abuses is to enhance
board independence and to empower shareholders by not only in-
creasing transparency, but also allowing shareholders to vote on spe-
cific items in compensation plans and to place binding resolutions
about compensation on the ballot at the annual meeting. 57
Professors Kevin Murphy and Michael Jensen reject the idea that
managers' power to extract rents from the firm is the full explanation
for excessive compensation.5 8 They attribute more of the problem to
the poor negotiating abilities of directors' remuneration commit-
tees.59 Thus, their focus for improving the remuneration process is
less on creating powerful shareholders and independent directors,
and more on improving the governance system in general. 60 Their
recommendations include changing the directors' mindset so that
they emphasize their role as monitors of the CEO rather than as sup-
porters of the CEO; disallowing the board to be chaired by past, cur-
rent, or future CEOs; limiting the number of outside CEOs on the
board; limiting the number of managers on the board to one, i.e., the
CEO; and having the board hire its own compensation consultant,
specifically, not the same one used by the firm when hiring lower-level
employees. 6 1
Professor David Walker argues that the increase in excessive exec-
utive compensation in recent years is attributable to the increase in
the number and type of avenues through which managers can appro-
priate value. 62 As methods of remuneration have become more com-
plex and opaque, the value of remuneration has increased
significantly. 63 During a six-year period in the 1990s, the median com-
pensation for CEOs of S&P 500 companies increased 160%; stock op-
tions for those CEOs during the same period increased 335%.64
Several studies suggest that executive compensation would not have
56. Id. at 40-55.
57. Id. at 190-210.
58. Jensen & Murphy, supra note 17, at 53.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 54.
61. Id. at 54-56.
62. See David I. Walker, The Manager's Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 591 (2005).
63. Id. at 597-98.
64. Id. at 641.
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risen as much absent the increase in options. 65 Today, stock options
have replaced cash salary as the largest part of the compensation pack-
age of the average CEO of a large corporation. 66 Merger-and-acquisi-
tion bonuses for CEOs during the 1990s also increased without
substituting for other forms of remuneration. 67 The same is true for
personal use of corporate aircrafts and receipt of loans at below-mar-
ket interest rates-many of which are forgiven. 6 Another rather se-
cret form of remuneration allows executives to receive dividends on
restricted shares that they may never earn (because "performance"
shares are awarded only where specific targets are met) or that may
not vest for many years. 69 In 2005, General Electric's CEO received
more than $1 million in dividends on unearned shares.7 0 In 2006,
Bank of America's CEO is scheduled to receive $2.89 million in divi-
dends on restricted stock. 71 Of the fifty CEOs (of large companies)
who received the largest restricted stock grants, thirty-seven were paid
dividends prior to the vesting of those shares.72 Moreover, the award
of restricted shares is becoming more and more common as the use of
stock options is diminishing.73
None of these pay methods seems to increase shareholder value;
rather, they suggest "at least some incremental appropriation. '74 The
implication for controlling compensation abuses is to avoid new forms
of compensation and perks, sticking to simple transparent pay pack-
ages that are disclosed in a detailed and timely fashion. 75 The pro-
posed rules, of course, do not suggest methods of compensation, and
if prior experience holds true, they may actually encourage new forms
of compensation and perks that will escape the new disclosure
mandates.
Although the aforementioned commentators now agree there is
something wrong with the levels of executive compensation and the
65. Id. at 641-43.
66. Id. at 661.
67. Id. at 643. Professors Jensen and Murphy also note that stock options could re-
duce salaries to offset their cost but, in fact, options are usuallyjust added on to pay pack-
ages without requiring any reduction in other pay. The result is that executives are
"systematically overpaid." Jensen & Murphy, supra note 58, at 58.
68. Walker, supra note 62, at 643-44.
69. Scott Thurm, Extra Pay: Many CEOs Receive Dividends on 'Phantom'Stock, WALL ST.J.,
May 4, 2006, at Al.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at A12.
74. Walker, supra note 62, at 645-50.
75. Id.
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system needs fixing, a few others still argue that the market is working,
and there is nothing to fix.7 6 To support this view, the "marketeers"
assert that arm's length bargaining for executive compensation pack-
ages is an unrealistic and unnecessary criterion because it sets a stan-
dard of perfection that cannot be met.77 To be taken seriously, this
assertion must be viewed with economic tunnel vision. While the asser-
tion is perhaps true in a theoretical sense, any interested lay observers,
including shareholders, workers, and the newspaper-reading public,
know that having one's pay package decided by one's friends-who
may get substantial personal economic benefit from increases in that
pay package-does not approach what passes for arm's length bar-
gaining for most people's employment contracts. It is the perception
of abuse that will have a much larger effect on businesses than strict
compliance with economic theory.
The "marketeers" also argue that there is no proof that CEOs,
either individually or as a group, are overpaid. 78 One has jokingly as-
serted the unlikelihood of "some massive secret conspiracy to keep
managerial pay levels high. '7 9 Certainly, high executive-pay levels are
no longer a secret; however, the absolute numbers and comparisons
with the pay of the rest of the workers at a firm have made it quite
clear to most observers that executive compensation has reached
levels that are affecting companies' bottom lines and are not accom-
plishing the performance for shareholders for which they were alleg-
edly intended.
It is these perceptions, whether economically provable or not,
that have given rise to the SEC's new disclosure proposals. Unfortu-
nately, neither changes in disclosure nor other historical attempts
have successfully limited excessive compensation.
HI. Shareholder Empowerment, Improved Governance, Tax
Regulation, Pay-For-Performance, and More
Disclosure Have Not Worked
A. Shareholder Empowerment and Improved Governance
Although there has been a good deal of discussion about empow-
ering shareholders as a method for overcoming excessive executive
76. John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?,
103 MicH. L. Rv. 1142 (2005); see Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay
Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1265 (2004).
77. Core, supra note 76, at 1159.
78. Thomas, supra note 76, at 1265.
79. Id.
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compensation, 80 shareholders have not, in fact, risen to the task.8' To
encourage success, SEC rules would have to go further than the new
disclosure requirements and, in addition, give shareholders new sub-
stantive rights.
Recent British reforms may serve as a model for the SEC. In Brit-
ain, since the 2002 regulations were promulgated under the Compa-
nies Act of 1985,82 shareholders have begun to participate in an
annual vote on executive pay packages, and even though the vote is
merely advisory, firms are very concerned that their proposals pass
and work hard to see that they do.8 3 British shareholders can base
their votes on more detailed information than United States share-
holders would have even with the new SEC regulations.8 4 British
shareholders are given a detailed report of options awarded and
whether or not they are in-the-money, information that United States
shareholders do not, and will not, have.8 5 In Britain, companies give a
clearer description of the current value of executive pension plans
and severance agreements. Furthermore, they must disclose whether
management hired the compensation consultants who provided ad-
80. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 46, at 195-99; see also Alan Murray, CEOs of
the World, Unite? When Executive Pay Can Be Truly Excessive, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2006, at A2.
Murray gives examples of excessive compensation, asserts that executive compensation
should be based only on the creation of value and not on surveys of CEO salaries, and
concludes that, therefore, shareholders should have more participation in setting execu-
tive pay. Id. He cites the following example: the CEO of Pfizer, Inc. was paid $79 million
over the last five years and has a guaranteed pension for life of $6 million although the
value of stockholders' shares has fallen 40% in that five-year period. Id.
81. See infra notes 104-115 and accompanying text. But see Vanessa Fuhrmans, Calpers
Puts Pressure on Board of UnitedHealth, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2006, at A3 (reporting that the
California Public Employees' Retirement System demanded a conference call with the
compensation committee of UnitedHealth Group's board of directors to discuss the $1.6
billion paper stock option gains held by the CEO, William McGuire, and threatened to
withhold votes for directors seeking reelection).
82. The Companies Act, 1985, c. 6 (Eng.).
83. Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short: 'No Excessive Pay, We're British,' WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,
2006, at C1; Joanna L. Ossinger, Poorer Relations: When It Comes to CEO Pay, Why Are the
British So Different?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at R6.
84. See Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations, 2002 No. 1986 (U.K) (regula-
tions made by the Secretary of State pursuant to § 257(2) of the Companies Act, 1985).
85. Eisinger, supra note 83, at CI, C12. When a corporation grants stock options as
part of a pay package, it is giving the manager the right to buy a certain number of shares
of its stock at a specified price, the strike price, during a particular time period in the
future. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1195 (8th ed. 2004). The original purpose of granting
options was to tie executive pay to performance. Having options encouraged the executive
to increase shareholder value. If, however, the strike price is below the market price of the
stock when the option is granted, the option is in-the-money because it already has intrin-
sic value without the executive's having accomplished anything.
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vice on management's pay packages.8 6 In addition to the regulations
themselves, the Association of British Insurers and the National Asso-
ciation of Pension Funds, two trade associations whose members own
about one-third of the shares in the United Kingdom equity market,
issue guidelines for companies to follow in setting executive compen-
sation policies and for shareholders to use in deciding how to vote on
those policies. 87 The two groups have great influence over British
companies, a situation that has no comparison in the United States.88
It is not conclusive that these differences have created more value
for British shareholders, but the following figures are suggestive. The
median value of total compensation for CEOs of the S&P 500 compa-
nies in 2004 was $6 million; the median total compensation for CEOs
of the top 100 British companies (the FTSE 100 stock index) in 2005
was $4.9 million.8 9 Between 2000 and 2005, the FTSE 100's average
annual return was 6.5% while the Dow Jones Industrial Average was
2% during the same period. 90 There are also a number of specific
examples of companies changing their executive compensation plans
in response to negative shareholder votes. In 2003, after shareholders
voted against GlaxoSmithKline's compensation plan because of a $35
million severance package for the CEO, Glaxo lowered the value of
the package by about half and also removed some of the perks.9 1
In the United States, shareholder activists who could probably in-
fluence executive compensation the most are hedge-fund managers,
but it is not likely that they will encourage complaints about pay, given
the huge amounts they pay themselves.92 As for corporate directors,
commentators note that although they are doing better at acting inde-
pendently of CEOs, they have a long way to go to achieve real inde-
pendence. 93 In general, directors are still unable or unwilling to
bargain at anything resembling arm's length when it comes to execu-
tive compensation. 94 All incentives encourage directors to richly re-
86. Id. at C12.
87. Report on the Impact of the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, MONDAQ
Bus. BRIEFING, Jan. 27, 2005, at Cl.
88. See Ossinger, supra note 83.
89. Eisinger, supra note 83, at Cl.
90. Id. at C12.
91. Ossinger, supra note 83.
92. Jesse Eisinger, Memo to Activists: Mind CEO Pays, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at Cl.
93. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Holstein, The Case for Cutting the Chiefs Paycheck, N.Y. TuMEs,Jan.
29, 2006, § 3, at 10.
94. Enablers of Excess: Mutual Funds & the Overpaid American CEO, Am. Fed'n of State,
County and Mun. Employees & Corp. Library 3 (Mar. 2006), available at http://
www.afscme.org/pol-leg/EnablersofExcess.pdf.
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ward CEOs and other top executives. 95 Directors want to be reelected
to the board, have management bestow rewards on them, be consid-
ered collegial and loyal, and avoid conflict.96 There are few, if any,
countervailing incentives to encourage directors to oppose unwar-
ranted executive compensation. 97 If shareholders could easily oust di-
rectors and vote on compensation packages, directors would have
more reason to control those packages.98
B. Tax Regulation
The failure of tax regulation to rein in excessive executive com-
pensation is epitomized by Congress' passage in 1993 of Internal Reve-
nue Code section 162 (m) that limited the corporate tax deduction for
executive compensation, other than performance-based compensa-
tion, to $1 million per year.99 The House Committee on Ways and
Means reported its belief that the new section would reduce excessive
compensation. 100 Clearly, the measure was a debacle of unintended
consequences.101 It encouraged the proliferation of option grants
(supposedly performance-based compensation), which became the
source of the most excess. Furthermore, companies willingly gave up
the deduction and started the practice of grossing up executive pay to
cover any taxes the recipients might owe.10 2
Of the one hundred largest United States companies, 52% paid
gross-ups to one or more executives in 2004.103 For example, this year,
when Capital One bought North Fork Bancorp, North Fork's CEO
became entitled to about $91 million in restricted stock, severance,
stock options, and stock-based units. 10 4 On that amount, the CEO will
pay nothing in tax because Capital One's shareholders will pay about
$44 million to the government for him. 10 5 It is an irony unknown to
95. Out of Control?, CONF. BD. REV., Mar./Apr. 2005 (Across the Board editor A.J. Vogl
interviewing Lucian Bebchuk).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
100. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 646 (1993).
101. See, e.g., Martin D. Mobley, Compensation Committee Reports Post-Sarbanes-Oxley: Unim-
proved Disclosure of Executive Compensation Policies and Practices, COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 111, 123
(2005).
102. Daniel Gross, Moneybox: Gross-Up? Gross Out, SLATE, Mar. 15, 2006, http://
www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=21 38119.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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most people until recently that all other workers pay taxes on
whatever salary and perks they receive from the company, but CEOs,
who may be making hundreds of times what the average worker re-
ceives, may pay nothing at all in taxes because shareholders pay the
taxes for them.
C. Pay-for-Performance
In spite of efforts to link CEO compensation to CEO perform-
ance, there is often little correlation between the two. 10 6 Between
1999 and 2002, John Chambers, the CEO at Cisco, was paid $280 mil-
lion while Cisco's profits and stock price fell precipitously. 10 7 During
that period, Dennis Kozlowski, CEO at Tyco was paid $332 million' °8
and then was convicted in 2005 of looting more than an additional
$600 million from the company. 10 9 Also during that period, Larry Elli-
son, CEO at Oracle, was paid $795 million just as Oracle's stock price
started its decline.110 One commentator has chosen AT&T's CEO, Ed-
ward Whitacre, as a member of his "pay-for-nonperformance Hall of
Shame.""' During the period from 2002 to 2004, AT&T's proxy
materials reported that because the company's stock had fallen to
67% of its prior value, Whitacre's incentive pay was reduced to 67% of
the targeted amount. 1 2 So, while shareholders lost 33% of their in-
vestment, Whitacre received 67% of his performance-based pay.' 1 3
Professor Rakesh Khurana asserts that CEOs' pay depends on factors
unrelated to CEOs' work: primarily the industry the company is in and
how well the general economy is performing. 14 For example, execu-
tives at big energy companies are generally paid much more than simi-
larly-situated executives in other industries.' 15
106. Interview by Graef Crystal with Paul Solman, The News Hour, Executive Excess
(Dec. 2, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec02/
ceol_12-02.html [hereinafter Solman Interview].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Ex-Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski Found Guilty, MSNBC, June 17, 2005, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8258729.
110. Solman Interview, supra note 106.
111. Murray, supra note 80, at A2.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Solman Interview, supra note 106.
115. SeeJ. Alex Tarquinio, Pay for Oil Chiefs Spiked Like Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006,
§ 3, at 10 (comparing 2005 compensation for an oil company CEO with 2005 compensa-
tion for CEOs in a steel company and an aluminum company of similar sizes: CEO of U.S.
Steel, $6.7 million; CEO of Alcoa, $7.5 million; CEO of Sunoco, $23 million).
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Professors Perry and Zenner have demonstrated that although ex-
ecutive compensation in large firms is more likely to increase for com-
panies in the top performance quartile than for those in the bottom
quartile, compensation is rarely cut for poor performers.11 6 Further-
more, executives and directors often use "financial engineering," e.g.,
repricing option grants, issuing new option grants, selling stock in the
firm after receiving option grants at lower strike prices, that limits pay-
for-performance incentives. 1 7 Empirical evidence shows little correla-
tion between executive bonuses and company performance.1'8 A re-
cent empirical study indicated that the more a company paid its CEO
relative to his peers, the more likely the company's shares did worse
than those of its peers. 119
More companies are, however, making an attempt to tie CEO pay
to company performance. Some are setting the strike price for stock
options awarded out-of-the-money so that the CEO has a profit only if
there is a significant rise in the share price wherein other sharehold-
ers also benefit. 120 Unfortunately, the SEC's new rules do not compel
disclosure of performance targets, so shareholders will not know
whether executives are meeting them.121 And even as they make a
show of linking executive pay to performance, companies determine
ways to get around the links, such as paying dividends on performance
shares that may never be earned in order to keep executive compensa-
tion up, whether or not they have done the same for shareholders.
Pay-for-performance works only when there is arm's length bar-
gaining based on market considerations. The editor-in-chief of Chief
Executive magazine has compared corporate CEOs to sports and en-
tertainment celebrities, rock stars, and investment bankers, all of
whom are paid for performance: if any of the four does poorly on the
field, at the box office, or in the markets, his (or her) pay will reflect
such failures.1 22 CEOs, on the other hand, choose the people who
116. Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or
Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 123, 138 (2000).
117. Id. at 139-42.
118. Lucian Bebchuk, How Much Does the Boss Make, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2006, at A10.
119. Ivan E. Brick, Oded Palmon, &John K. Wald, CEO Compensation, Director Compensa-
tion, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 403 (2006); James
Surowiecki, The Financial Page: Overcompensating, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13 & 20, 2006, at 54.
120. Joann S. Lublin, Boards Tie CEO Pay More Tightly to Performance, WALL ST. J., Feb.
21, 2006, at Al, A14.
121. Id.
122. Holstein, supra note 93, at 10.
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determine their compensation 123 and are not punished for poor
performance.
Graef Crystal, a well-known compensation consultant, has found,
after studying hundreds of companies, almost no relationship be-
tween CEO pay and profits, but rather between an individual CEO
and other CEOs: a third of companies want their CEO's pay package
to be in the top 25%, and no company wants to pay their CEO below
the industry average. 124
D. More Disclosure
Thus, full disclosure may actually increase executive compensa-
tion; if CEOs' pay packages are readily available information, an in-
crease for one will create increases for all. 12 5
Professor Edward Iacobucci has argued that disclosure, by lower-
ing the cost of obtaining information, keeps institutional investors in
the stock market, and their substantial participation is advantageous
to all shareholders because of the control they can have over manage-
ment.126 The error in this argument is the assumption that institu-
tional investors will, in the interest of all shareholders, act against
excessive pay packages for executives. A 2006 study sponsored by the
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees and
the Corporate Library, a corporate governance research group, found
that mutual funds usually back executive pay plans and oppose share-
holder attempts to limit them. 127 Large mutual funds supported exec-
utive pay plans 75.6% of the time and supported shareholder
proposals against pay plans only 27.6% of the time. 128 A possible ex-
123. Id.
124. Solman Interview, supra note 106; see also Holstein, supra note 93 (asserting "if you
give someone two million options at today's price and it's not indexed to the market and
it's not indexed to the peer group, he's going to get paid on the basis of what the market
does, not on what he does").
125. Scannell, supra note 41 at A2 (quoting Ronald 0. Mueller, a compensation spe-
cialist, who noted that "companies benchmark against each other"); Solman Interview, supra
note 106; see also Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture
or Market Driven ?, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1171, 1264 (2004) (asserting that more disclosure may
encourage "an American-style executive pay spiral" in other countries); Nathan Knutt,
Note, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal Thyself 47 ARiz. L. REv. 493,
502-03 (2005).
126. Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 U. To-
RONTO L.J. 489, 497-99 (1998).
127. Jennifer Levitz, Do Mutual Funds Back CEO Pay? WALL ST.J., Mar. 28, 2006, at Cl;
see also Gretchen Morgenson, Fund Managers May Have Some Pay Secrets, Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2006, § 3, at 1 [hereinafter Morgenson, Fund Managers].
128. Levitz, supra note 127 at Cl.
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planation for this phenomenon is a potential conflict of interest: fund
managers are trying to get corporate executives to buy their services in
investment banking, retirement plan administration, and other
money management services and, therefore, want to gain the execu-
tives' goodwill. 29 Furthermore, mutual fund managers may also be
receiving excessive compensation. 130 Information about their pay
packages is not widely available because disclosure is not required for
the many fund management companies that are private or for manag-
ers who are not among the five most highly paid executives in very
large companies. 131 The new SEC rules do not contain any changes
for disclosures about mutual fund executives. John Bogle has written
to the SEC recommending that mutual funds be required to disclose
the compensation paid to the highest-paid executives of their manag-
ers and distributors. 132
Professor Bebchuk, while praising the new SEC disclosure rules
for giving shareholders access to better information, concludes that
they will not be adequate to fix the current executive compensation
system.133
IV. Alignment of Shareholders and Workers in Combating
Excessive Executive Compensation
In 1973, CEOs of large corporations were earning, on average,
forty-five times the pay of their workers. 134 In 1991, CEOs were earn-
ing 140 times; by 2002, CEOs of large corporations were earning, on
average, almost 500 times what their workers were earning. 35 In 2004,
compensation for the average CEO of a Fortune 500 company was
approximately $12 million.' 36 These figures have been the subject of
commentator outrage 37 and, finally, some firms seem to be taking
notice, but only in a very small way.138 For example, Jerrald Fishman,
CEO of Analog Devices, in 2005 received $144.7 million in deferred
129. Id.
130. See Morgenson, Fund Managers, supra note 127 at 1.
131. See id.
132. Bogle Letter, supra note 43.
133. Bebchuk, supra note 118 at A10.
134. Solman Interview, supra note 106.
135. Id.
136. Jerry Goldberg, The Fortunate 2500 of the Fortune 500, http://www.jgfortunate2500
list.com/home.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2006).
137. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Enemies of Reform, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2002, at A21; see also
Morgenson, Holy Cow, supra note 17 at 1.
138. Morgenson, supra note 17 at 1 (discussing compensation ofJerrald Fishman, CEO
of Analog Devices, and his refusal of some planned options).
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compensation; $931,000 in salary; a bonus of $414,000; $400,000 in
options; and $2.85 million from the exercise of previously granted op-
tions, even though between 2000 and 2005, Analog's stock lost 6.55%
of its value compared to a loss of 3.38% for the Philadelphia Semicon-
ductor Index.1' 9 Probably in response to negative publicity, due in
part to an SEC investigation of the company's compensation practices,
Fishman announced he was going to refuse options the board of di-
rectors had planned to give him in 2006.140
It is not only the absolute numbers that make executive pay seem
grossly excessive, but executive pay has achieved indisputable eco-
nomic significance. From 1993 through 2003, public companies in the
United States have paid aggregate compensation to their top-five ex-
ecutives of about $350 billion.14 ' That amount was 6.6% of net in-
come for those companies during that period. 142 From 2001 through
2003, top-five pay for those companies was almost 10% of net in-
come. 143 Compensation for top executives has been rising faster than
inflation, faster than the average worker's salary, faster than corporate
earnings, and faster than stock market returns. 144 Professor Donald
Hambrick notes that if lower-rank workers think that executives are
"looting the firm," the company will have sizable costs policing un-
happy employees. 145 Professors Cowherd and Levine found in their
1992 study that the greater the gap between the pay of top executives
and lower-level workers, the worse product quality was. 146
A disturbing trend that suggests the failure of shareholder power,
director responsibility, and regulation, is the excessive compensation
being awarded to executives of corporations in bankruptcy. When
UAL Corporation, parent of United Airlines, went into bankruptcy,
workers were asked to make severe sacrifices while executives were
granted stock options and restricted shares equaling about 8% of the
total number of shares to be issued when the company emerges from
139. Id.
140. Id. at 8.
141. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL'y 283-303 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stractid=648682.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Eisinger, supra note 92, at C7.
145. Id.
146. Douglas Cowherd & David Levine, Product Quality and Pay Equity Between Lower-
Level Employees and Top Management: An Investigation of Distributive Justice Theory, 37 ADMIN.
Sci. Q. 302 (1992).
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bankruptcy. 47 In addition to over $1 million in salary and bonus, the
CEO was granted $4.5 million in other benefits, a $3 million signing
bonus, and over $15 million in options and restricted shares. 148
This unfortunate situation arises from unrealistic alliances. Cor-
porate directors are supposed to represent the interests of the corpo-
ration's owners-the shareholders-when, in fact, they are aligned
with the top executives who choose them and have positions very simi-
lar to their own. Managers are supposed to increase shareholder
wealth when, in fact, by overcompensating themselves, they take value
that should belong to non-management shareholders. Although top-
level executives and lower-level workers are all employees of the com-
pany, they have opposing interests regarding compensation. It is argu-
able that on issues of executive compensation, non-management
shareholders may be more aligned with workers than with directors.
At first blush, the idea of workers representing shareholders may
seem radical, but it has some definite advantages over the usual
United States methods. Outside directors, who theoretically may be
more independent, get most of their information about the company
from the CEO. t 49 If the board included company workers, its directors
would be less dependent on the CEO for knowledge about the com-
pany, a board's most important resource. 15 0 If workers were included
on compensation committees, they might mitigate against the ten-
dency of boards to increase executive compensation in self-interest as
CEOs of their own companies.' 51
Researchers at the Center for Effective Organizations at the Uni-
versity of Southern California have asserted that merely creating
boards that are more responsive to shareholders may be too narrow a
perspective in today's global-business world.' 52 Other stakeholders, es-
pecially knowledge workers, are increasingly being viewed as impor-
tant factors in the success of a company. 153 Their research has shown
that the power to oppose and challenge the CEO has the greatest ef-
fect on a company's financial performance.' 5 4 Information, knowl-
147. Gretchen Morgenson, Gee, Bankruptcy Never Looked So Good, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2006, § 3, at 1.
148. Id. at 4.
149. Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as
Directors 8 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 283, Apr. 2006).
150. Id. at 10.
151. Id. at 11.
152. Edward E. Lawler III et al., Adding Value in the Boardroom, 43 MAss. INST. TECH.
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 92 (2002).
153. See id. at 92-93.
154. Id.
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edge, and power are the most effective tools a board has for creating
value,' 55 and those can be areas of worker expertise.
In 1998, Professors Schwab and Thomas reported on shareholder
activism by labor unions. 56 They asserted that equating managers'
and shareholders' interests was naive.15 7 They noted a historic shift in
the 1990s in which worker-shareholders would prod other outside
shareholders into holding management accountable. 158 For example,
workers' unions can take better advantage of disclosed information
about executive compensation because they are experienced in deal-
ing with compensation structures and mechanisms. 159 If workers and
shareholders form a coalition to reduce management's share of the
company's income, both groups will benefit. 160 The shareholder
groups that have been most active in fighting executive compensation
excess have been worker-pension funds. There would be a natural af-
finity between these employee/shareholder groups and the workers at
companies being targeted for their compensation plans.
A current coalition of pension funds is being led by the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME"),
the largest public employee and healthcare workers union in the
United States. 61 The AFSCME has received the backing of the Cali-
fornia Public Employees' Retirement System ("CALPERS"), the larg-
est pension fund in the United States, other pension funds, and
shareholder activists in withholding votes from ten of Home Depot's
eleven directors for their failure to tie executive compensation to per-
formance. 162 Since the current CEO of Home Depot was hired in
2000, Home Depot shares have declined about 12%.163 During that
same period, the CEO received about $200 million in salary, bonus,
stock, stock options, and other perks.' 64 In 2005, he received $38.1
155. Id. at 93.
156. StewartJ. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder
Activism &y Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1018 (1998).
157. Id. at 1020.
158. Id. at 1021.
159. Id. at 1087.
160. See id.
161. Press Release, Am. Fed'n of St., County and Mun. Em., AFSCME Seeks to Hold
Home Depot Board Accountable for Excessive Executive Pay (May 22, 2006), available at
http://www.afscme.org/press/pr060522.htm.
162. Id.; see also Jennifer Waters, MarketWatch: Home Depot Shareholder Showdown,
MARXETWATCH, May 24, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com.
163. Waters, supra note 162.
164. Brian Grow, Home Depot's CEO Cleans Up, Bus. WK. ONLINE, May 23, 2006, http://
www.businessweek.com/print/investor/content/may2006/pi2006523_284791 
.htm.
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million.' 65 Among the most problematic payments is the locked-in bo-
nus of $3 million Home Depot's CEO receives every year, regardless
of the company's performance. 166 As one commentator noted, "[a]
guaranteed bonus is no longer a bonus. It's just pay."'1 6 7 The displea-
sure of Home Depot shareholders is paralleled by dissatisfaction
among Home Depot's retail workers. Although the CEO's bonus rose
from $5.75 million in 2004 to $7 million in 2005, bonuses to Home
Depot's 319,000 non-salaried employees based on store financial per-
formance fell from $90 million in 2004 to $44 million in 2005.168 The
average bonus Home Depot workers received in 2005 was $137.93,
and no part of the workers' bonus plan is guaranteed. 169 Unhappy
workers lead to unhappy customers, which ultimately leads to un-
happy shareholders.
In the European Union, it is not unusual for representatives of
workers to participate on supervisory boards, boards of directors, and
similar corporate bodies.' 70 Of the thirty member countries of the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 17 1 thirteen
have provisions for workers to have board-level representation in pub-
licly-traded corporations. 17 2 That is a system, combined with new in-
creases in disclosure of compensation information, that might
encourage outside shareholders to act more vigorously in their own
interest in combating excessive executive compensation. Workers on
boards could provide critical information to both outside directors
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (explaining statements by Charles Elson, director of the Weinberg Center for
Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Thorsten Schulten & Stefan Zagelmeyer, Board-Level Employee Representation in
Europe (1998), http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/about/1998/09/study/tn9809201s.html
(comparative study providing a summary of board-level employee representation in EU
member states and Norway with empirical evidence).
171. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Building Partner-
ships for Progress: About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
OECD is an organization created by treaty in 1960 that counts the following countries as
member nations: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
172. COMM. ON WORKERS' CAPITAL, TRADE UNION ADVISORY COMM. TO THE ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., GLOBAL UNIONS DISCUSSION PAPER: WORKERS' VOICE IN COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE-A TRADE UNION PERSPECTIVE 20 (Sept. 2005), available at http://
www.tuac.org/statemen/communiq/0512cgpaper.pdf.
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and outside shareholders, which might make both outside directors
and CEOs more accountable for their compensation practices. 73
V. Conclusion
Executive pay packages that have an excessive impact on a firm's
bottom line have increased exponentially in recent years. The SEC's
latest attempt to curb abuses requires additional disclosure to give
shareholders clearer and more complete information about how
much executives are actually receiving. Much has been written about
executive compensation and ways to curb excess. Nevertheless, to
date, attempts at shareholder empowerment, improved corporate gov-
ernance, tax regulation, pay-for-performance, and disclosure have not
been successful in having executive compensation reflect added share-
holder value. The new regulations will make it easier for shareholders
to know the actual amount top management is getting in current and
deferred compensation. But without additional changes such as, for
example, worker and shareholder participation in corporate govern-
ance, it is reasonable to assume that directors will continue to approve
pay packages that exceed the value top managers bring to the firm.
173. Id.
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